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Abstract 
Using data on the U.S., we study the effects of employer-provided health 
insurance on dynamic employment substitution between 1990 and 2007 by 
exploiting the interindustry variation in health care coverage. We find that 
industries with a high health benefit structure in 1990 have experienced slower 
employment growth of part-time workers relative to full-time workers, in 
particular part-time routine workers, while the relative wage of part-time to full-
time workers and capital per worker have increased more in such industries. We 
suggest that this can be explained as firms’ and workers’ optimal responses to the 
benefit structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, the share of individuals working part-time has steadily increased in the 
United States, reaching around 20% (the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, henceforth BLS). 1 
Over the same period, the cost of health insurance has also risen (Figure 1),  which has aroused 
controversy over the effects of such changes on the labor market. In particular, it is usually 
argued that as employer-provided health insurance is typically tied to full-time employment, 
firms who face higher health care coverage are likely to replace those workers with part-time 
workers to minimize the cost of labor (Buchmueller et al. 2011; Baicker and Chandra 2005; 
Lettau 1997; Buchmueller 1999).  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
This paper examines whether the initial level of employer-provided health insurance can 
explain dynamic employment substitution between full-time and part-time workers. Employer-
provided health insurance constitutes the largest portion of fringe benefits (around 7% of total 
compensation),2 and the employer contribution to insurance premiums as well as the share of 
beneficiaries vary across industries. The standard incidence theory indicates that workers bear 
the full incidence of employer-provided health insurance in the form of lower wages. But 
nominal wage rigidity partially redistributes the incidence of rapidly rising insurance premiums 
(Sommers 2005): rather than decreasing workers’ wages, growing health care costs may force 
firms to bear some of the burden of employer-provided health insurance.3 As firms might not be 
able to lower wages, the usual argument against providing generous employment benefits to full-
time workers is that firms with high benefit costs might have an incentive to change the 
composition of workers toward more part-time workers.  
The effect of health insurance benefits on employment substitution is, however, 
theoretically ambiguous when we further consider the labor supply channel; given the high costs 
of obtaining health coverage, health insurance could be a critical factor in labor supply decisions 
                                                          
1 The BLS defines part-time workers as those who work fewer than 35 hours per week. 
2 Total fringe benefits as a proportion of total compensation were around 30% between 1991 and 2003 (the BLS). 
Health insurance comprises the largest portion of fringe benefits, followed by paid leave and retirement benefits.  
3  One might raise a concern that high health benefits are associated with low wages so that overall employer-
provided health insurance is not a burden for firms. Most studies that attempt to find trade-off between wage and 
employer-provided health insurance find a positive correlation, as high-paying jobs often pay generous health 
benefits (Currie and Madrian 1999). 
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and a higher share of full-time workers with health care coverage would attract employees to 
work full-time rather than part-time.4 Thus, the labor supply curve of full-time relative to part-
time workers would shift out (Buchmueller and Valletta 1999). Past findings about the effects of 
employer-provided health insurance on employment substitution between full-time and part-time 
employees are mixed (see Cutler and Madrian (1998) for a review). Our study extends the 
insights of the existing literature by using industry-level data that span over 17 years, allowing us 
to examine the long-term effects of health coverage on employment of full-time versus part-time 
labor. 
We begin by providing theoretical predictions about the effects of interindustry health 
benefit differentials on labor market dynamics using a simple labor market model. In particular, 
we show that the prediction of the model with dynamic effects of labor supply can be very 
different from that of the model considering only labor demand. In our empirical framework, we 
first document that different industries are likely to face different levels of health insurance 
benefits both in terms of coverage and costs, and this difference is persistent over time. Using 
U.S. data between 1990 and 2007, we find that the relative employment of full-time to part-time 
workers has increased more in industries that had a high share of health coverage in 1990. These 
findings are consistent with the prediction of our model that reflects labor supply as well as labor 
demand, emphasizing the importance of considering workers’ incentives when evaluating labor 
market effects. We further show that, consistent with the recent literature on job polarization 
(Acemoglu and Autor 2011; and Autor et al. 2003), this adjustment of relative employment has 
been associated with reduced employment of routine occupations among part-time workers. This 
is because routine workers are more easily replaced by other production factors or outsourced 
(Autor et al. 2003), in particular, by Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) capital 
(Shim and Yang 2015).  
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
This section introduces a simple labor market model to study how the interindustry differentials 
in health care coverage are related to subsequent changes in composition of full-time and part-
time workers.5 All markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. There is a representative 
                                                          
4 66% of those aged 16–64 has private health insurance that comes through employment (March Current Population 
Survey, 2001–2010).  
5 See Appendix A for derivation.  
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firm that uses only labor in the production; full-time and part-time workers. Results are robust to 
the addition of capital in the production function. All variables are in per capita terms so that ݄௜௧ 
(resp.	 ෨݄௜௧) is the employment share of full-time (resp. part-time) workers in industry i at time t. 
The firm’s problem is: 
 
max	݌௜௧ ݂ሺ݄௜௧, ෨݄௜௧ሻ െ ݓ௜௧݄௜௧ െ ݓ෥௜௧ ෨݄௜௧                                          (2.1) 
  
subject to the production function6 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ 	ߣ௜௧݄௜௧ఈ ෨݄௜௧ଵିఈ,                                                        (2.2) 
 
where ݌௜௧  is the price of consumption good, ߣ௜௧  is the industry-specific shock, and ݓ௜௧  is the 
wage rate of full-time workers including health benefits in industry i at time t. On the other hand, 
ݓ෥௜௧ , the wage rate of part-time workers, does not include health benefits. We obtain the 
following relative demand equation of which implication is summarized in Proposition 1. 
 
log ቀ௛೔೟௛෩೔೟ቁ ൌ log ቀ
ఈ
ଵିఈቁ െ log ቀ
௪೔೟
௪෥೔೟ቁ	.                                           (2.3) 
 
Proposition 1 (The effect of the industry’s higher health insurance benefits on relative 
employment: Demand only). Suppose that the relative health insurance benefit of industry i is 
different from that of industry j so that ݓ௜௧/ݓ෥௜௧  differs from ݓ௝௧/ݓ෥௝௧ . Then the relative 
employment of full-time workers is lower in industries with high health care coverage. 
 
This is the usual argument based on the static model that generous benefits lead firms to 
substitute away from full-time employees toward part-time employees, to whom firms do not 
have much obligations to provide health insurance. This argument holds as long as the two types 
of workers are not perfect complements. 
We now turn to the supply side of the labor market in order to consider the full equilibrium 
effect of interindustry differentials in health care coverage. We assume that the dynamic labor 
supply equation of full-time workers is as follows: 
 
                                                          
6 One can alternatively use the CES production function, which yields similar implications. 
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log	݄௜௧ ൌ log	݄௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߠሾlogݓ௜௧ିଵ െ logݓഥ௜௧ିଵሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧,                            (2.4) 
  
where ߠ ൐ 0 and ݓഥ௜௧ିଵ is the average wage (health insurance benefit) for full-time workers in 
ݐ െ 1. The first term, log	݄௜௧ିଵ, captures the persistence of the labor. The second term captures 
the idea that the supply of full-time workers increases with the level of health insurance benefits 
relative to the average benefits in the previous period. This dynamic labor supply equation can be 
obtained under the assumptions that (1) it takes time for workers to obtain information on health 
benefits of other industries and (2) the benefits are highly persistent as in data.7  
We obtain the following two laws of motion for employment and hourly wage for full-time 
workers. Proposition 2 summarizes the implication of equation (2.5), which is of our interest. 
 
∆log	݄௜௧ ൌ 	ߠሾlogݓ௜௧ିଵ െ logݓഥ௜௧ିଵሿ ൅ ߝ௜௧,                                    (2.5) 
 
∆log	ݓ௜௧ ൌ 	െ ఏఎఈାఎሺଵିఈሻ ሾlogݓ௜௧ିଵ െ logݓഥ௜௧ିଵሿ ൅ ߥ௜௧,                           (2.6) 
 
where ߥ௜௧ ൌ ఏఎఈାఎሺଵିఈሻ ቀ
ଵ
ఎ ∆log	߶௜௧ െ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఎሻ
ఎ ∆log	ݓ෥௜௧ െ ߝ௜௧ቁ. 
 
Proposition 2 (The effect of higher health insurance benefits on relative employment: Supply 
and Demand). The relative employment of full-time workers increases over time in industries 
with high initial health benefits.  
 
As a result, Proposition 1, which is obtained without consideration of the labor supply 
channel, that generous benefits increase the relative employment of part-time to full-time 
workers, may not hold in the dynamic setup. Instead, as long as labor is mobile across industries, 
workers have incentives to supply more full-time labor in industries with high health insurance 
benefits. 
We finally note that part-time workers are not directly compensated by health benefits, 
which makes employees reluctant to work part-time when the level of those benefits rises. Hence, 
if we estimate equation (2.5) with ෨݄௜௧ (share of part-time employment rather than the level), we 
will obtain negative ߠ for part-time workers, which is the opposite to the full-time workers. As a 
                                                          
7 The share of workers with health insurance is higher among full-time employees than part-time employees (66% vs. 
7% based on 1991 March Current Population Survey) and is persistent over time (Figure 3). 
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result, the ratio between full-time and part-time workers will increase more in high benefit 
industries. 
Figure 2 summarizes our discussion graphically. Let ܧ௢  be the original equilibrium. As 
health insurance benefits increase, the relative demand for full-time workers decreases 
(Proposition 1) resulting in the equilibrium ܧௗ. However, it also attracts workers to work full-
time so that the relative supply shifts to the right, moving the equilibrium to ܧ௙ (Proposition 2). 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
We use the Census, March Current Population Survey (CPS), and EU KLEMS data between 
1990 and 2007, and thus, our data cover the period before the global financial crisis. Our main 
analysis focuses on this period as health insurance premiums show a notable increase since the 
late 1980s (Cutler and Madrian 1996; Gutowski et al. 1997). Age is restricted to 16−64 years and 
we only consider full-time or part-time employees in wage-and-salary sectors excluding those 
who are in military. We follow the BLS’s definition of part-time workers as those who work 
fewer than 35 hours per week. The Census and March CPS provide information on employment, 
hours worked, types of health insurance, employer contribution to health insurance, occupation 
and union membership, while the EU KLEMS data provide information on productivity, capital 
and real output for 30 industries. Information on the proportion of employer-provided health 
insurance to total compensation is not available in the data. Instead, we use (1) the share of full-
time workers covered by employer-provided health insurance in each industry and (2) the 
amount of employer contribution to health insurance as proxies for the benefit cost since 
industries with the higher share of beneficiaries or with higher employer contribution are more 
likely to bear the burden of rising health insurance costs than other industries.8  
 Table 1 shows the share of full-time workers, the share of full-time workers with 
employer-provided health insurance, and employer contribution to health insurance among full-
time workers across industries. EU KLEMS data provide information of 30 industries based on 
the North American Industry Classification (NAICS) and thus, we follow the the structure of the 
                                                          
8  The information on the share of full-time workers with health benefits is available from 1980, while the 
information on employer contribution is available from 1991.  
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NAICS in this paper as well.9 The mean share of full-time workers is 86%: the retail trade 
industry has the lowest share at 60%, while the transportation equipment industry has the highest 
share at 96%. The extent of the health care coverage among full-time workers also shows a great 
deal of variation across industries although the mean is 69%: the lowest share is observed in the 
agricultural industry (24%) whereas the highest share of workers with benefits is 87% in the 
industry of post and telecommunications industry. Employer contribution has a similar 
distribution: it varies from $497 (agriculture) to $2,953 (transport equipment), and the mean is 
$1,874. We note that cross-industry variation is much greater in the share of health coverage than 
the full-time employment rate. The standard deviation across industries is 0.165 for health care 
coverage while that for the share of full-time workers is 0.098. Since our measures for the burden 
of health benefits are calculated among full-time workers, the variation is not driven by industry 
difference in the share of full-time workers. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
The first graph in Figure 3 presents a scatter plot of the fraction of full-time workers with 
health benefits between two periods of time; 1990 and 2007. The second graph also depicts the 
relationship of employer contribution in 1991 and 2007. They show that industries that provided 
relatively high health insurance benefits in 1990 (or 1991) still provided high benefits in 2007, 
which indicates persistence in health care coverage across industries.  
 
<Figure 3> 
 
To identify the effects of health coverage on employment substitution over 17 years, we 
estimate the following equation, which is usually used in the growth literature that analyzes 
convergence in economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Mankiw et al. 1992). 
 
∆	ݕ௜௧,௧ା௞ ൌ 	ߠܾ௜௧ ൅ ߚݔ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,                                              (3.1) 
 
                                                          
9 The Census system up to the 1990 Census was based on the structure of the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC). This classification was replaced in 1997 by the NAICS and the 2000 Census industrial classification system 
was therefore based on the structure of the NAICS.  
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where 	ݕ௜௧ is the variable of interest in industry i at time t such as employment and wage, and 
∆	ݕ௜௧,௧ା௞ is the average annual growth rate of the variable 	ݕ௜௧ between ݐ and ݐ ൅ ݇ (i.e., between 
1990 and 2007). 	ܾ௜௧ is the share of full-time workers with employer-provided health insurance or 
employer contribution to health insurance in industry i at time t. ݔ௜௧ includes industry-specific 
variables that that can affect the subsequent labor market outcomes. In each regression, we 
weight the regression by the initial (i.e., 1990) employment of each industry. 
For instance, we regress the average employment growth rate of full-time and part-time 
workers (i.e., ∆ܧ௜ଵଽଽ଴,ଶ଴଴଻ ൌ ሾlogሺܧ௜ଶ଴଴଻ሻ െ log	ሺܧ௜ଵଽଽ଴ሻሿ/17, where ܧ௜ is the number of workers 
in industry i) on share of full-time workers with health insurance benefits in 1990 as well as 
other control variables. By using the share of full-time workers with benefits instead of the share 
of all workers with benefits, we capture industry-level health benefits that are not driven by share 
of full-time workers across industries. Since the burden of health benefits in each industry has 
not changed much over time, we use industry-level growth rates as dependent variables and the 
initial health care coverage as a main regressor instead of using industry fixed effects.10  
As control variables, we include the labor unionization rate in 1990 and capital per worker 
in 1990. 11  For instance, a labor union can affect both the number of health insurance 
beneficiaries in the initial period and the dynamic changes in the labor market (Alder et al. 2014). 
In addition, if workers’ abilities are different from each other and they are positively associated 
with the capital-labor ratio, the high ratio of beneficiaries can be the compensation for their 
abilities and the subsequent labor market changes can be also related.   
One potential concern for identification is an endogenity of the main regressor	ܾ௜௧ . In 
particular, industries with more generous health benefits may correlate with other unobservable 
factors that affect employment growth. That is, more generous health benefits could signal 
workers’ productivity which, in turn, could affect employment growth. We capture this effect 
directly by controlling for the initial wage ratio between full-time and part-time workers. In order 
to address the potential endogeneity, we also use the previous decade’s (i.e., 1980) share of full-
                                                          
10 Standard deviation of insurance coverage (1981–2008) ranges from 0.14–0.17 depending on the year chosen. 
After taking out average health insurance benefits across years, the standard deviation reduces to 0.0–0.04, 
suggesting that within industry variation over-time is very small. 
11 For the union membership database, see Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) for details. 
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time workers with health insurance benefits as an instrumental variable (IV) for the initial level 
of health benefits.12  
 
4. Results 
In panel A of Table 2, we report the results for how the initial level of employer-provided health 
insurance affects the growth rate of employment and wage. Column 1 in panel A shows that the 
initial share of full-time workers with health benefits has a negative but not statistically 
significant relationship with the subsequent total employment growth between 1990 and 2007. 
Columns 2 and 3 show that the average full-time employment growth rate is not significantly 
related to the initial share of beneficiaries while that of part-time workers is negatively related to 
it: the average growth rate of part-time workers decreases by 5.8% when the share of 
beneficiaries in 1990 increases by 1%.13 Figure 4 shows this relationship. The slope for part-time 
workers is negative and steeper than that for full-time workers. Columns 4 and 5 show that high-
beneficiary industries have experienced lower subsequent real wage growth for full-time than for 
part-time workers.14 As Figure 2 suggests, an increase in labor supply of full-time workers 
lowers the wage of full-time workers relative to part-time workers. These findings on 
employment and wage support our hypothesis that labor supply is an important factor; consistent 
with the prediction of our model, the part-time employment growth is lower in industries with a 
high share of beneficiaries and that adjustment is associated with more labor supply toward full-
time employment.  
  
<Table 2> 
<Figure 4> 
 
The IV estimates using the previous decade’s share of beneficiaries are reported in 
Appendix Table B1. Both the OLS and IV regressions yield nearly identical coefficients, 
                                                          
12 Due to data availability, we use the IV for the regressor of share of full-time workers with health benefits only, we 
have data from 1980. For the regressor of employer contribution, we cannot use the lagged term as an IV since the 
information is available from 1991.   
13 When we use the changes in employment share of full-time and part-time workers as dependent variables, the 
part-time share declines by 3.3%, while the full-time share increases by 3.3% between 1990 and 2007. 
14 The results in columns 4 and 5 show the negative effect of initial union membership on the subsequent wage 
growth, indicating that the average growth rate of real output per worker is lower in industries with high union 
membership rates, which will be discussed below. 
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suggesting endogeneity may not be a huge concern. The first stage F-statistics for the IV 
estimation is high at 161.65. 
Panel B in Table 2 presents estimates of employment and wage growth using employer 
contribution to employer-provided health insurance. The results are similar to those in panel A 
when we use the share of full-time workers with health benefits. Total employment growth 
decreases by 1.1% when employer contribution increases by $1,000. In particular, the average 
growth rate of part-time employment declines by 2.2% when employer contribution rises by 
$1,000. Figure 5 depicts that part-time employment growth responds more to employer 
contribution than full-time growth. Columns 4 and 5 also show that the relative wage growth of 
part-time to full-time workers is higher in industries with a high burden of providing health 
insurance.  
 
<Figure 5> 
 
Since the mid-1980s, employment has become polarized, with employment shifting away 
from routine occupations toward non-routine (cognitive and manual) jobs (Autor et al. 2003). 
Table 3 shows that the decrease in part-time employment is mostly driven by reduction in routine 
workers, which is consistent with the phenomenon of job polarization.15 The routine occupations 
include “sales,” “office and administrative support,” “production, craft and repair,” and “operator, 
fabricator and labourer,” which are more substitutable for (ICT) capital than non-routine 
occupations (Acemoglu and Autor 2011).16 When the initial share of beneficiaries increases by 
1%, the average growth rate of part-time routine employment declines by 8.0% (column 2 in 
panel A), while that of non-routine workers decreases by 2.0% (column 4 in panel A, not 
significant at the 10% level).17 The intuition behind this result is as follows: the higher ratio of 
full-time to part-time workers increases the production cost of firms as the fraction of full-time 
workers with health care benefits remains similar over time. Hence, firms with a high burden are 
more likely to employ new technology to increase production efficiency. The price of (ICT) 
                                                          
15 The IV results are similar to the OLS and are reported in Table B2, Appendix B. 
16  Cognitive occupations include “managers,” “professionals,” and “technicians.” Manual occupations include 
“protective services,” “cooking, building and grounds cleaning,” and “personal care and personal services.”  
17 This result is consistent with Mathur et al. (2015): the employment of manual workers has not been affected by 
the Affordable Care Act which requires medium and large employers to provide health insurance to employees 
working at least 30 hours per week.  
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capital has dropped significantly over the sample period and it is the routine occupations that are 
easily substituted for this type of capital. As a result, the decline of the number of part-time 
workers has been supplemented by the adoption of more capital.18 Column 5 in panel A shows 
that capital per worker increases 5.7% when the initial fraction of beneficiaries increases by 1%. 
Given that fringe benefits comprise 30% of total compensation and about a quarter of fringe 
benefits are employer-provided health insurance,19 this result indicates that a small fraction of 
compensating differentials between full-time and part-time workers can provide firms with an 
incentive to adopt new technology. The last column in panel A shows that the growth rate of real 
output per worker rises, consistent with the finding of an increase in real wages of both full-time 
and part-time workers in Table 2. 
 
<Table 3> 
 
We now interpret the negative relationship between the subsequent wage growth and initial 
union membership in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. It directly follows from the observation that 
the average growth rate of real output per worker (i.e., labor productivity) decreases by 7.5% 
when the union membership rate increases by 1% (column 6 in panel A, Table 3): as argued by 
Alder et al. (2014) and Bradley et al. (2013), the existence of labor union might lower firms’ 
incentive to innovate, which also lowers the productivity growth. As long as the wage is 
positively associated with the labor productivity, the subsequent wage growth would be 
negatively related to the level of union membership in the initial year.  
When we use employer contribution as a main regressor, the results are similar. Panel B 
shows similar patterns to those in panel A in Table 3. The negative employment growth comes 
from routine workers: when employer contribution increases by $1000, the annualized 
employment growth rates of full-time routine and part-time routine workers decrease by 1.1% 
and 2.5%, respectively. Consistent with the job polarization literature, the average growth rate of 
capital per worker increases by 1.4% and that of real output per worker also rises by 2.1% 
between 1991 and 2007.  
                                                          
18 Similar arguments that the high production cost gives firms the incentive to adopt the new technology or to use 
other production factors can be found in Borjas and Ramey (2000) and Shim and Yang (2015). 
19 Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employer costs for employee compensation historical listing (annual), 
1986-2001.” http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/home.htm (accessed in February 2015). 
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 So far, we have examined the effects on annualized growth between 1990 and 2007. In 
Tables 4 to 7, we report the estimates for periods between 1990 and 2000 and between 2000 and 
2007 to discern whether the effects of the initial share of health benefits (or the initial share of 
employer contribution) are different across time. Results in Table 4 indicate that the decrease in 
part-time employment in industries with high health care costs was more pronounced for the 
period between 2000 and 2007 than between 1990 and 2000. One possible explanation is that 
health insurance premiums grew faster during the later period (Figure 1). Also, employer 
contribution to health insurance shows a steep increase since the late 1990s, which may put 
additional financial burden to firms (Figure 6). The wage growth is higher for part-time workers 
than for full-time workers for both periods, although the part-time wage growth is not significant 
between 2000 and 2007 in Table 4. When employer contribution is used as a main regressor 
(Table 5), the results show similar patterns to when the share of workers with employer-provided 
health insurance (Table 4) is instead used. In particular, when employer contribution increases by 
$1,000, part-time employment decreases by 3.7% between 2000 and 2007, which is much greater 
than the 1.1% decline between 1991 and 2000. Table 5 also shows that the wage growth of part-
time employment is greater than that of full-time employment for both periods. 
 
<Table 4> 
<Table 5> 
<Figure 6> 
 
Consistent with the previous results, column 2 in Tables 6 and 7 shows that the decrease in 
part-time employment is driven by the decline in routine workers. Part-time non-routine workers 
also decreased between 2000 and 2007, but size of the decline for routine workers is much 
smaller. Overall, the results from Tables 4 to 7 show that the relationships observed in the 
baseline sample period are also present when we split the sample period, but at a different 
magnitude. 
 
<Table 6> 
<Table 7> 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effects of employer-provided health insurance on employment 
substitution between 1990 and 2007 by exploiting large variation in health care coverage across 
industries. Past studies have examined the link between health insurance and labor market 
outcomes. This paper contributes to this broader literature on the relation between health 
insurance and its implication on the labor market.  
The analysis of labor market responses to the benefit structure may inform about the 
effects of recent federal health care reforms in the United States. Since the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) of 2010 requires employers with at least 50 full-time workers to provide those working at 
least 30 hours per week with health insurance, it could be argued that employers that operate on 
the margin have an incentive to hire more part-time workers to minimize the cost of expanded 
coverage. But this study shows that this argument is not necessarily the case. The study finds that 
high-benefit industries have experienced slower employment growth of part-time workers 
relative to full-time workers, while the relative wage of part-time to full-time workers has 
increased. With a simple labor market model, we show that this phenomenon can be explained as 
firms’ and workers’ optimal responses to the benefit structure. Our results are consistent with 
recent studies (Mathur et al. 2015; Garrett and Kaestner 2015) which find little evidence that the 
ACA has caused a shift toward part-time employment.  
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Figure 1: Trend of monthly health insurance premiums for singles (1980-2010) 
 
Note: The unit is measured in thousands of 1999 U.S. dollars. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics , U.S. General Accounting Office, Kaiser 
Family Foundation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. See Appendix C (Data Appendix) for details.  
 
Figure 2: Labor market dynamics 
 
Note: ݄௜௧/ ෨݄௜௧ is the relative employment of full-time to part-time workers and ݓ௜௧/ݓ෥௜௧ is the relative wage of full-
time to part-time employees.  
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Figure 3: Health coverage benefits by industry between 1990 (1991) and 2007 
  
 
Figure 4: Full-time and part-time employment growth against the initial level of beneficiaries  
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Figure 5: Full-time and part-time employment growth against the initial employer contribution  
 
 
Figure 6:  Employer contribution to health insurance over time (1992-2014) 
 
Source: March Current Population Survey 1992–2014. The unit is measured in thousands of 1999 U.S. dollars. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by industry 
Industry Share of full-time workers in 1990 
Share of full-time 
workers w/ EHI  
in 1990 
Employer 
contribution to 
EHI in 1991 
Agriculture 0.796 0.240 0.497 
Mining and quarrying 0.944 0.791 2.717 
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.904 0.755 1.923 
Textiles, textile, leather and footwear 0.883 0.649 1.278 
Wood and of wood and cork 0.904 0.640 1.567 
Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 0.867 0.765 2.193 
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear 
fuel 0.958 0.863 2.528 
Chemicals and chemical products 0.945 0.860 2.572 
Rubber and plastics 0.938 0.793 2.344 
Other non-metallic mineral 0.931 0.788 2.038 
Basic metals and fabricated metal 0.948 0.792 2.452 
Machinery, nec  0.945 0.824 2.595 
Electrical and optical equipment 0.949 0.806 2.408 
Transport equipment 0.959 0.852 2.953 
Manufacturing, nec; recycling 0.896 0.719 1.970 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.954 0.872 2.641 
Construction 0.877 0.472 1.260 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
fuel 
0.858 0.489 1.097 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, 
except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.891 0.694 1.746 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles; repair of household 
goods 
0.605 0.469 0.933 
Hotels and restaurants 0.737 0.479 0.908 
Transport and storage 0.863 0.704 2.355 
Post and telecommunications 0.915 0.871 2.599 
Financial intermediation 0.875 0.765 1.746 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 0.782 0.518 1.095 
Community social and personal services 0.616 0.363 0.730 
Public admin and defence; compulsory 
social security 0.910 0.817 2.318 
Education 0.726 0.777 1.708 
Health and social work 0.763 0.700 1.633 
Other community, social and personal 
services 0.749 0.611 1.433 
Note: Employer contribution to EHI is in thousands of dollars.  
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Table 2: Estimates of employment and wage growth  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Total 
employment 
growth 
Full-time 
growth 
Part-time 
growth 
Full-time 
wage growth 
Part-time 
wage growth
Panel A: Using share of full-time workers with EHI (1990–2007) 
Share of full-time 
workers w/ EHI 
-0.022 -0.020 -0.058** 0.020*** 0.046*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.005) (0.016) 
Union membership 
0.016 0.016 0.024 -0.036*** -0.043** 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.006) (0.018) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
R2 0.037 0.032 0.152 0.614 0.376 
Panel B: Using employer contribution to EHI (1991–2007) 
Employer 
contribution to EHI 
-0.011** -0.011** -0.022*** 0.003* 0.016*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Union membership 
0.032 0.034 0.047* -0.032*** -0.058*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.013) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
R2 0.097 0.095 0.259 0.463 0.565 
Notes: There are 30 industries. Regressions are weighted by number of employees by industry. Explanatory 
variables are measured in 1990. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 3: Estimates of routine employment and capital/worker growth  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full-time 
& routine 
Part-time 
& routine 
Full-time &
non-routine 
Part-time & 
non-routine 
Capital  
per worker  
Real output 
per worker 
Panel A: Using share of full-time workers with EHI (1990–2007) 
Share of full-time 
workers w/ EHI 
-0.035 -0.080*** 0.004 -0.020 0.057** 0.061** 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) 
Union membership 
0.016 0.021 0.001 0.004 -0.012 -0.075** 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R2 0.100 0.342 0.015 0.030 0.355 0.266 
Panel B: Using employer contribution to EHI (1991–2007) 
Employer 
contribution to EHI 
-0.011** -0.025*** -0.005 -0.010 0.014** 0.021*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Union membership 0.025 0.037 0.018 0.018 -0.013 -0.094***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R2 0.130 0.394 0.036 0.075 0.304 0.373 
Notes: There are 30 industries. Regressions are weighted by number of employees by industry. Explanatory 
variables are measured in 1990 except for employer contribution to EHI which is measured in 1991 U.S. dollars of 
thousands. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimates of employment and wage growth for separate periods (using share of full-time 
workers with EHI) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total 
employment 
growth 
Full-time 
growth 
Part-time 
growth 
Full-time 
wage growth 
Part-time 
wage growth
Panel A: Growth between 1990 and 2000 
Share of full-timer 
w/ EHI in 1990 
-0.028 -0.029 -0.031** 0.010 0.043*** 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) 
R2 0.060 0.065 0.075 0.630 0.623 
  Panel B: Growth between 2000 and 2007 
Share of full-timer 
w/ EHI in 2000 
-0.021 -0.012 -0.117** 0.035*** 0.060 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.049) (0.010) (0.040) 
R2 0.038 0.041 0.234 0.473 0.166 
Notes: Explanatory variables are measured in 1990 and 2010, respectively. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Estimates of employment and wage growth for separate periods (using employer 
contribution to EHI) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total 
employment 
growth 
Full-time 
growth 
Part-time 
growth 
Full-time 
wage growth 
Part-time 
wage growth
Panel A: Growth between 1991 and 2000 
Employer 
contribution in 1991 
-0.011** -0.012** -0.011*** 0.001 0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
R2 0.127 0.143 0.111 0.589 0.621 
  Panel B: Growth between 2000 and 2007 
Employer 
contribution in 2000 
-0.011* -0.009 -0.037*** 0.007** 0.022*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
R2 0.105 0.093 0.399 0.302 0.380 
Notes: Explanatory variables are measured in 1990 and 2010, respectively. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 6: Estimates of routine employment and capital/worker growth for separate periods (using 
share of full-time workers with EHI) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full-time 
& routine 
Part-time 
& routine
Full-time &
non-routine
Part-time &
non-routine
Capital 
per worker 
Real output 
per worker
Panel A: Growth between 1990 and 2000 
Share of full-timer 
w/ EHI in 1990 
-0.047** -0.049*** 0.004 0.012 0.051* 0.058* 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) 
R2 0.183 0.252 0.042 0.043 0.298 0.179 
  Panel B: Growth between 2000 and 2007 
Share of full-timer 
w/ EHI in 2000 
-0.023 -0.148*** 0.001 -0.078 0.066*** 0.073** 
(0.031) (0.043) (0.039) (0.049) (0.017) (0.028) 
R2 0.167 0.517 0.145 0.131 0.324 0.443 
Notes: Explanatory variables are measured in 1990 and 2010, respectively. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Estimates of routine employment and capital/worker growth for separate periods (using 
employer contribution to EHI) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Full-time 
& routine 
Part-time 
& routine
Full-time &
non-routine
Part-time &
non-routine
Capital 
per worker 
Real output 
per worker
Panel A: Growth between 1991 and 2000 
Employer 
contribution in 1991 
-0.018*** -0.019*** -0.006 0.003 0.013* 0.020** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
R2 0.313 0.379 0.072 0.040 0.276 0.249 
  Panel B: Growth between 2000 and 2007 
Employer 
contribution in 2000 
-0.004 -0.034*** -0.001 -0.026*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
R2 0.162 0.503 0.146 0.253 0.289 0.516 
Notes: Explanatory variables are measured in 1990 and 2010, respectively. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Firms’ first order conditions are: 
  
ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ௣೔೟௬೔೟௛೔೟ ,                                                             (A.1) 
 
ݓ෥௜௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ ௣೔೟௬೔೟௛෩೔೟ .                                                        (A.2) 
 
Then the inverse demand function is assumed: ݌௜௧ ൌ ߦ௜௧ݕ௜௧ିఎ . Substituting the inverse demand 
function into the first order conditions yields:  
 
ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ߶௜௧݄௜௧ఈሺଵିఎሻିଵ ෨݄௜௧ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఎሻ,                                             (A.3) 
 
ݓ෥௜௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ߶௜௧݄௜௧ఈሺଵିఎሻ ෨݄௜௧ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఎሻିଵ,                                       (A.4) 
 
where ߶௜௧ ≡ ߦ௜௧ߣ௜௧ଵିఎ which represents the sector-specific shock. Taking logs and combining the 
two first order conditions yield: 
 
log	 ෨݄௜௧ ൌ log	ݓ௜௧ െ logݓ෥௜௧ െ log ቀ ఈଵିఈቁ ൅ log ݄௜௧.                               (A.5) 
 
Arranging this equation yields equation (2.3). We now substitute (A.5) into (A.3) and obtain:  
 
log	݄௜௧ ൌ Ω ൅ ଵఎ log߶௜௧ െ
ఈାఎሺଵିఈሻ
ఎ logݓ௜௧ െ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵିఎሻ
ఎ logݓ෥௜௧,                    (A.6) 
 
where Ω ≡ ଵఎ ቂlog ߙ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߟሻ log ቀ
ఈ
ଵିఈቁቃ. Rearranging (A.6) provides equation (2.6). 
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Appendix B 
Table B1: IV Estimates of employment and wage growth during 1990–2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Total 
employment 
growth 
Full-time 
growth 
Part-time 
growth 
Full-time 
wage growth 
Part-time 
wage growth
Share of full-time 
workers w/ EHI 
-0.029 -0.027 -0.067** 0.017*** 0.050** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.006) (0.019) 
Union membership 
0.021 0.021 0.030 -0.034*** -0.045** 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.007) (0.020) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
R2 0.034 0.028 0.148 0.609 0.374 
Notes: The IV is the previous decade’s (i.e., 1980) share of beneficiaries. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. Explanatory variables are measured in 1990. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
 
Table B2: IV Estimates of routine employment and capital/worker growth during 1990–2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full-time 
& routine 
Part-time 
& routine 
Full-time &
non-routine 
Part-time & 
non-routine 
Capital  
per worker  
Real output 
per worker 
Share of full-time 
workers w/ EHI 
-0.038* -0.088*** -0.001 -0.022 0.056** 0.072*** 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.021) (0.022) 
Union membership 
0.018 0.026 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.082***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) 
Capital/worker ratio 
0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R2 0.100 0.339 0.013 0.030 0.355 0.259 
Notes: The IV is the previous decade’s (i.e., 1980) share of beneficiaries. There are 30 industries. Regressions are 
weighted by number of employees by industry. Explanatory variables are measured in 1990. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
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Appendix C (Data Appendix for Figure 1) 
The data are spliced from a variety of sources to form one continuous time series. Real health 
premiums are constructed by dividing nominal health insurance premiums by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).  
 
1980–1985: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1994 and 
1999 editions, Washington D.C., available from 
 https://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html.  
 
Average health insurance premium per capita is calculated by dividing health insurance income 
by population (also from the Statistical Abstract). Missing years (1981 and 1985) are interpolated 
by first deflating the data by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI to account for inflation.  The 
CPI data are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) Washington D.C., CPI Detailed Report, 
Table 24, accessed in August 2015, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables.   
 
1986–1988:  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Compensation and Working Conditions 
(2002), Employer Costs for Employee Compensation Historical Listing (Annual), 1986-2001, 
Table 3, p. 12, Washington D.C., available from: http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecechist.pdf.  
 
1989–1995: U.S. General Accounting Office (February 1997), Employment-Based Health 
Insurance, Costs Increase and Family Coverage Decreases, Report to the Ranking Minority 
Member, Subcommittee on Children and Families, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 
GAO/HES-97-35, U.S. Senate, Washington D.C., Appendix II, p. 33, available from: 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/223812.pdf.  
 
1996: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2012) California, U.S., Employer Health Benefits 
Annual Survey Archives, various issues, accessed in January 2015, http://kff.org/health-
costs/report/employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-archives.   
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1997: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (2013) Rockville, Maryland, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, accessed in January 
2015, http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/survey_comp/Insurance.jsp.  
 
1998–2010: Kaiser (2012). Kaiser (2015) California, U.S., Premiums and Worker Contributions 
Among Workers Covered by Employer-Sponsored Coverage, 1999-2014, accessed in January 
2015, http://kff.org/interactive/premiums-and-worker-contributions. 
 
